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THE "AIR COACH" EXPERIMENT AND
NATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT POLICY
-
PART 11*
By HAROLD A. JONES AND FREDERICK DAVIS
Mr. Jones, Member, Civil Aeronautics Board; Yale University,
B.A., 1920; Ohio State University, LL.B., 1923; Member Ohio and
California Bars. Formerly, private practice of law, Nourse, Jones,
Thompson and Kelly, Los Angeles, California.
Mr. Davis, Confidential Assistant to Mr. Jones; Indiana Law
School, LL.B., 1938; J.D., 1939; Member Indiana Bar. Formerly, Gen-
eral Counsel's Office, Civil Aeronautics Board.
W E have pointed out that the present air coach service "experi-
ment" involves more than merely experimentation with fares. It
may foreshadow changes in our national civil aviation policy and a sub-
stantial rearrangement of our air transport pattern. Before considering
these possibilities, it will be helpful to review the present state of our
national air policy, and its background.
IV. OUR NATIONAL POLICY FOR CIVIL AVIATION
It is not easy to define our national policy objectives with a satisfac-
tory degree of certainty. Our only legislative pronouncement on the
subject, the Declaration of Policy contained in the Civil Aeronautics
Act,1 is so all-embracing as to mean anything or everything to any per-
son. The civil air transport system there envisaged is one "properly
adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the na-
tional defense," designed to furnish "adequate, economical, and efficient
service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discrimina-
tions, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive compet-
itive practices," and with "competition to the extent necessary to assure
the sound development of an air-transportation system properly adapt-
ed to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense."
And in connection with this section there must also be considered
the "mail pay" or "subsidy" provision of the Act,2 which is itself also an
important statement of very general policy. It is there stated that in
determining the amount of money to be paid by the Federal Govern-
ment to an air carrier for the transportation of mail, the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board shall take into consideration the carrier's need "for compen-
* Continued from Winter issue of JOURNAL, 17 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1 (1950).
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the writers and are not to be
.attributed to the Civil Aeronautics Board.
152 Stat. 980, Sec. 2; 49 U.S.C. 402.2 Ibid., Sec. 406(b) ; 49 U.S.C. 486(b).
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sation for the transportation of mail sufficient for the performance of
such service, and, together with all other revenue of the air carrier, to
enable such air carrier under honest, economical and efficient manage-
ment, to maintain and continue the development of air transportation
to the extent and of the character and quality required for the com-
merce of the United States, the Postal Service, and the national de-
fense."
It is not surprising that there has been a considerable diversity of
opinion as to the proper implementation of such broad legislative
standards. Obviously, an air transport system properly adapted to the
present and future needs of foreign and domestic commerce will mean
one thing to one person and something else to another. A system de-
signed to meet the needs of the postal service may be a system more or
less extensive than one required to serve foreign and domestic com-
merce, and a system suited primarily to national defense needs may be
considerably different from either. And what is the meaning of "com-
petition to the extent necessary to insure the development of an air
transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and
domestic commerce," etc.? 3
The search for a civil air transport policy which can more nearly be
expressed in terms of common understanding has gone on almost con-
tinuously since the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act. Various Con-
gressional committees, Presidential commissions, executive agencies and
private organizations and individuals have wrestled with the problem
from time to time, and the effort continues right down to the present.
The very fact that an answer has been sought so extensively seems to
indicate that we really have no firm, settled policy at this time, and per-
haps in the present troubled state of the world this is just as well. Un-
der present conditions, the needs of national defense and interstate and
foreign commerce in relation to air transport may change overnight.
But in order to evaluate the worth and effect of the current experi-
mentation in "air coach" transportation, it would seem essential that
we attempt to reach some basis of common understanding with respect
to policy objectives, or possibly to consider alternative concepts and
examine the experiment on that basis. A brief review of certain expres-
sions of policy during the interval since the origin of the Civil Aeronau-
tics Act should be helpful.
Federal Aviation Commission
A good place to start should be with the Federal Aviation Commis-
sion appointed by President Roosevelt pursuant to the Air Mail Act of
1934.4 That statute authorized the President to appoint a committee
3 The interpretation of this phrase has been a particularly troublesome prob-
lem for the Civil Aeronautics Board. For a history of the Board's shifting position
on "competition," see Westwood, Choice of the Air Carrier for New Air Transport
Routes, 16 Geo. Wash. Law Review 159 (1948).
4 48 Stat. 195; 39 U.S.C. §§469 and 469s.
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for the purposes of an immediate study and recommendations for "a
broad policy covering all phases of aviation and the relation of the
United States thereto."
In an editorial published at the time, Dr. Fred Fagg, Jr., now Presi-
dent of the University of Southern California, then Professor of Law at
Northwestern University and soon to become legal advisor to the Com-
mission, refrained the question to which the Commission was supposed
to find an answer as follows: Is the airline business to be brought to
maturity under the Adam Smith conception of competition or under
the guidance of the "newer" economics?
The Commission had little doubt as to the kind of civil air transport
system to be encouraged and devreloped. Its first recommendation read
as follows:
"It should be the policy of the United States to maintain a posi-
tion of world leadership in air transport, and to lend such aid as
may be necessary to insure that the most modern and efficient
equipment and methods shall be applied on American domestic and
foreign airlines."6
Nor was there any question about the use of subsidies. The third rec-
ommendation read:
"The carriage of mail should be put on a commercial basis, with
payments to lines within the amount received by the Post Office.
Whatever additional sums are for the time being necessary to main-
tain and develop adequate transport services should be allocated
specifically to that purpose by the Government."
'7
The report went on to recommend the establishment of a permanent
commission, appointed by the President, which would have broad gen-
eral supervisory and regulatory powers over both domestic and foreign
air transport.
The Commission report was transmitted to Congress on January 21,
1935, and the entire recommended program was embodied in a bill,
H. R. 5174, introduced on the same day by Mr. Lea of California.
Three and a half years and several bills later, during which time there
had been almost constant Congressional hearings, the Civil Aeronautics
Act was passed. At several times during the hearings and debates over
the various proposed bills and amendments, sponsors stated that finan-
cial aid to air transportation by the Government was to be a temporary
affair, to last only until the infant industry could walk on its own legs,
but nowhere was this concept set forth in the Act.
If the language used in the Declaration of Policy - "the encourage-
ment and development of an air transportation system properly adapted
to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce
of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense"
55 J. AIR L. 540 (1934).
o Report of the Federal Aviation Commission (January, 1935) p. 9. See 6 J.
.AIR L. 163 (1935).
7 Ibid.
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- is intended to mean what was so boldly expressed in the Commission
report, then Congress envisaged an air transportation system which
would lead the world both domestically and internationally, to be sup-
ported with Government funds to the extent necessary to insure such
leadership and the utilization of the most modern and efficient equip-
ment and methods.
Board of Investigation and Research
No important questions as to national air transport policy were
raised during the years between the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act
and the end of the war. We were preoccupied with other important
matters, and, furthermore, most of the 'airlines were in no position to
expand and in no great need of financial aid. Congress did, however,
establish in 1940 a Board of Investigation and Research s which was to
investigate and report on public aids to domestic transportation gener-
ally. In a report submitted to Congress on September 18, 1944,' this
Board pointed out that the financial assistance provided by Section 406
(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act would have a profound effect upon the
kind, size, and type of our civil air transport system. The report
quoted with approval portions of a letter addressed by the Civil Aero-
nautics. Board to Senator Walter F. George in 1942,10 in which the
Board stated its position to the effect that in its view Congress had not
intended to direct the Board to achieve national objectives wholly unre-
lated to the development of a sound air transportation system.11
The report further stated that specific recommendations would be
premature, but remarked:
"It seems not unlikely that the future development of air trans-
portation will be influenced to a significant extent by what Govern-
ment policy regarding financial aid is to be. The progress of civil
air transport could be accelerated to almost any extent by requisite
Government expenditures."' 12
There were also quoted with approval excerpts from Civil Aeronau-
tics Board Member Harllee Branch's separate opinion in a mail-rate
proceeding 13 in which he persuasively argued that financial aid to the
8 Transportation Act of 1940, Title III, Part I, Sec. 302 (a) (2) ; 54 Stat. 953.
9 Public Aids to Domestic Transportation, H. Doc. 159, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1944).
10 Ibid., p. 464.
11 "If the contrary interpretions were adopted, there would be no limit to the
national defense projects which carriers might be expected to perform; and the
required financial assistance from Post Office appropriations might well be multi-
plied many times. The Board does not understand that Congress intended to
authorize the Board to require air carriers, for example, to build up a large reser-
voir of aircraft, personnel, equipment, and other facilities greatly in excess of the
requirements of a civil air transportation system, to be held virtually in trust or
on call for war air-transport purposes. Congress vested in the Board no power by
which it might effect such a result, and in the absence thereof, the objective of
such a reservoir of planes, equipment, and reserve personnel, and organization
could be realized only through the voluntary co-operation of the carriers . .. It
normally would not be possible to absorb such a reservoir of aircraft, equipment,
and such an organization in a sound air transportation system."
12 Op. cit. supra, n. 9, p. 465.
13 Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Mail Rates, 3 C.A.B. 733, 761 (1942).
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airlines should be based on a policy of promoting a financially self-suffi-
cient air transport system composed of individually profitable airlines,
receiving only a fair and reasonable compensatory rate for the carriage
of mail.
Soon after the end of hostilities, however, due to over-optimism, rev-
olutionary advancements in the aviation art, and a too-rapid expansion
in routes and facilities, most of our certificated airlines, domestic and
foreign, got into financial difficulties. Some were faced with bank-
ruptcy, and almost all were in desperate need of working capital and
capital funds to meet requirements for new postwar equipment.
It seemed that the broad statement of national policy objectives con-
tained in the Civil Aeronautics Act needed a second look, and there was
concern both in the White House and on Capitol Hill. This concern
suddenly crystallized into action in the summer of 1947, when, within a
period of a few weeks, the President took steps to have a coordinated
statement of air policy prepared by the Executive Branch, and ap-
pointed a special committee to assist him "in formulating an integrated
national aviation policy." At the same time a temporary "Congres-
sional Aviation Policy Board" was set up by the 80th Congress with the
same general objective.
President's Air Policy Commission
The President's Air Policy Commission was' created on July 18,
1947.14 The Commission submitted its report on January 1, 1948.15
In discussing civil aviation it supported the concept of a self-sufficient
air transport system, 16 but, somewhat inconsistently, also endorsed for
14 In his letter of appointment the President said in part: "There is an ur-
gent need at this time for an evaluation of the course which the United States
should follow in order to obtain, for itself and the world the greatest possible ben-
efits from aviation.
"It is for these reasons ... I am creating a temporary Air Policy Commission
to make an objective inquiry into national aviation policies and problems, and to
assist me in formulating an integrated national aviation policy ...
"The Air Policy Commission should study, among other pertinent aspects of
the problem, such questions as the current and future needs of American aviation,
including commercial air transportation and the utilization of aircraft by the
armed services; the nature, type, and extent of aircraft and air transportation
industries that are desirable or essential to our national security and welfare;
methods of encouraging needed developments in the aviation and air transporta-
tion industry; and improved organization and procedures of the Government that
will assist it in handling aviation matters efficiently and in the public interest.
"The final recommendations of the Commission must, however, go beyond the
limits of any one phase of aviation. They should be so broad in scope and purpose
that they will assist in revising old policies and in framing new ones, and will
serve as a guide for formulating a carefully considered national air policy."
15 SURVIVAL IN THE AIR AGE, January 1, 1948. See 15 J. AIR L. & COM. 69
(1948).
16 "We consider that direct Government financial aid to commercial airlines is
fully justified on grounds of national security and economic welfare. We believe
the air transport system of this country can, with such aid now, become self-sup-
porting in the future. We are convinced that any impartial investigators of air
transport would endorse the use of public funds to obtain such a sound air trans-
port system. This means the continued granting of subsidies to airlines for an
additional period." (p. 102.)
"Our major problem is to get [common carrier airlines] started once again up
the ladder toward self-sufficiency." (p. 113.)
AIR COACH EXPERIMENT
the most part the view that the civil air transport system should be
inseparable from the military air arm, and as a reservoir of aircraft, per-
sonnel, equipment and other facilities to be drawn upon by the military
in time of emergency. This seeming contradiction can be reconciled
only on the basis that the Commission concluded that a civil air trans-
port system composed of privately owned and managed airlines (strong,
financially sound and self-sufficient) and operating as public utilities,
would fit all the needs of Commerce, the postal service and the national
defense.
Congressional Aviation Policy Board
The law establishing a temporary Congressional Aviation Policy
Board became effective on July 30, 1947,1 and after extensive hearings
its report was submitted to Congress on March 1, 1948.18 The first sen-
tence of the report reads as follows:
"Within two years after cessation of hostilities in World
War II, general concern over national security and the threatened
bankruptcy of the aircraft industry and the civil air carriers of the
United States, indicates necessity for review of national aviation
policy by the Congress."
The Congressional group did not deal directly with the concept of
an individually self-sufficient air transportation system, but laid more
emphasis upon the national defense aspect. At the risk of oversimplifi-
cation, and only for the purposes of discussion here, it may be said
that the Congressional Board reached the following conclusions:
1. The ,Civil air transportation industry and the military air arms
are indivisible and must fit into a single pattern.
2. National security requires a financially sound, efficient and mod-
ern air transport industry.
3. The country should have a large civil air fleet operating in for-
eign and domestic air commerce with safety and certainty,
serving commerce and industry during peacetime while remain-
ing available for immediate conversion to military use in an
emergency.
4. Such a civil air fleet must be as large as possible commensurate
with the budgetary limits of our economy.
5. This may best be effected by the stimulation of passenger, cargo
and other air traffic.
The report listed as possible means of stimulation of traffic the
carriage of all first-class mail by air at first-class rates when the move-
ment of such mail could be appreciably expedited, the carriage of do-
mestic air parcel post at experimental rates, and the extension to a
5-year basis of the feeder-line experiment. No attempt was made to
estimate the desirable size of the civil air transport reservoir of potential
17 Public Law 287, 80th Congress; 61 Stat. 676. See 14 J. AIR L. & CoM. 365
(1947).
18 National Aviation Policy, Rep. No. 949, 80th Cong., 2nd Session, March 1,
1948. See 15 J. AIR L. & COM. 208 (1948).
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logistic aircraft, because it had been impossible to secure an estimate of
the requirements of the military from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The implications of this report and the broad outline of policy con-
tained in it would lead directly to the conclusions that the assumption
of the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1942 that Congress did not intend to
direct the Board to achieve national objectives unrelated to the devel-
opment of a sound air transportation system could no longer be sup-
ported, and that if military requirements were such that they could
not be met by the available aircraft of a financially sound and self-
sufficient civil air transport industry, then that industry would be
expanded to the extent necessary to meet military requirements within
"budgetary limits that can be supported by the American economy."
ACC Statement of Air Policy
Meanwhile, prior to the appointment of the Air Policy Commission,
President Truman had requested that a statement of air policy be
prepared and presented to him by the Air Coordinating Committee.19
This statement was prepared and presented to the President on
August 1, 1947.20 "The basic policies governing United States trans-
port," said the Air Coordinating Committee, "are embodied in the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. The Civil Aeronautics Board in its
decisions undertakes to apply policies derived from the Act rather than
to create new policies." The Committee made no attempt to make
more definitive the concept of civil air transport policy contained in
the Declaration of Policy of the Civil Aeronautics Act, except as may
be inferred from the following statement:
"Despite the high volume of traffic, air travel is still relatively
expensive compared to other forms of transportation. Although im-
proved service, comfort, and speed increase business, present rates
remain a limiting factor on the growth of traffic. The ultimate goal
of government rate policy is inexpensive, mass air transportation
provided by private carriers which are financially sound and which
can operate without subsidy." (Italics added.)
No emphasis was placed upon the development of civil air trans-
portation as a potential transport reserve in time of emergency, the
Committee merely stating that in time of war it must be possible to
utilize the commercial air transport system to augment the military air
transp6rt services.
Since their publication, the conclusions and recommendations ex-
pressed in these reports have been widely considered and discussed,
19 An interdepartmental advisory and coordinating group consisting of one
representative each from the Departments of State, Commerce, Air Forces, Navy,
Post Office, and the Civil Aeronautics Board, with a representative of the Bureau
of the Budget serving as a nonvoting member.
20 A Statement of Certain Policies of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment in the General Field of Aviation (August, 1947). See 14 J. AIR L. & COM.
366 (1947).
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both in and out of the Government, but up to the present time no
legislative expression of a more clearly defined national air policy has
resulted.
Meanwhile, official exploration of the subject continues. The inves-
tigation of the airline industry instituted by the Senate Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee early in 1949, under the able Chair-
manship of Senator Edwin C. Johnson, is still under way, and will of
necessity involve important policy considerations. In addition, Presi-
dent Truman has been concerned with the overall coordination of
Federal programs in the various fields of transportation, and air trans-
port policy is likewise an important element to be considered in any
planning in this area.
Sawyer Report
In connection with the latter project, the President on August 30,
1949, requested the Secretary of Commerce to outline "the major policy
issues which need to be resolved at this time in order to achieve maxi-
mum effectiveness and consistency of Federal programs in the trans-
portation field. The Secretary's report, which was submitted on De-
cember 1, 1949, was something more than a statement of issues, how-
ever, ,for, as the report pointed out, a future transportation program
could best be considered if the issues were developed against a policy
framework. Consequently, the Secretary's presentation developed cer-
tain concepts vitally related to civil air transport development. The
Secretary stated that:
"The general position which this report advances is that if an-
other type of carrier or another carrier of the same type can per-
form the service at a profit, it is entitled to the business and the
carriers which are being protected should restrict themselves to op-
erations in which they have a clear economic advantage. This
general principle is set forth in the Transportation Act of 1940 as
basic national transportation policy. An exception to this general
principle applies in cases where certain relatively uneconomic serv-
ices must be maintained because their continued existence is essen-
tial for national defense purposes. ' '21
This view of national policy would call for the discontinuance of
present protective regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board designed
to maximize revenues for the certificated air carriers. For example, it
would be inconsistent with such a concept to impose economic restric-
tions upon the operations of irregular air carriers, rather than to permit
them complete competitive freedom with all the certificated air lines,
Government-aided or not.22 In short, full freedom of opportunity
should prevail, governed only by natural economic forces.
21 Issues Involved in a Unified and Coordinated Federal Program for Trans-
portation, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, December 1, 1949, p. 74. See 17 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 93 (1950).
22 Ibid., p. 73.
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In developing this concept, the Secretary took the position that the
transportation system of this country, including air transportation,
is now developed to the point that services which are not self-supporting
should be abandoned, and the regulating authorities should encourage
carriers under their jurisdiction to divest themselves of All marginal
operations. 2
3
Thus we have the range of policy concepts with respect to civil air
transport. At one extreme there is the approach of the Congressional
Aviation Policy Board, which seems to envisage a civil system integrated
with defense requirements, and subsidized to the extent militarily
necessary within the budgetary limits of our economy. Directly op-
posed is the position of the Secretary of Commerce, who advocates the
abolition of Federal economic regulation and the substitution of free
competition, including the elimination of all non-self-supporting serv-
ices.
The significance of the air coach development must be measured
largely in terms of the long-range air transport policy ultimately
adopted.
V. THE TREND OF AIR COACH SERVICE
As presently operated, air coach service is a very attractive bargain.
The opportunity to travel on our largest, fastest and most modern air-
craft at reductions of 25 percent to 40 percent under standard fares, with
intermediate stops reduced to a minimum, naturally has great con-
sumer appeal. Such limitations on passenger service as exist - night-
time departures, more crowded seating arrangements, etc. - are for
many travelers completely outweighed by the price advantage which
can be realized, and, in areas of heavy traffic flow, coach operations to
date have clearly demonstrated this fact.
On high-density route segments, coach flights have operated at very
high load factors, and have carried an impressive total of passengers.
For example, Capital Airlines operated its New York-Chicago coach
service in 1949 at an average load factor of 76.91 percent, carrying a
total of 43,106 passengers.2 4 For the year ending March 31, 1950, be-
tween Washington and Chicago the load factor was 78.25 percent, with
43,785 passengers. During the same period Northwest's New York-
Seattle service operated at a load factor of 78.40 percent, and carried
over 90,000 passengers.
Even allowing for diversion from regular services, which has been
estimated on an overall basis to be approximately 31 percent, and on a
fully allocated cost basis, such operations are substantially profitable,
and hence appear, when considered apart, to rest upon an economically
23 Ibid., pp. 83-4.
24 It should be noted that during the first quarter of 1950, however, load fac-
tors fell to 56.17 percent, reflecting the additional competition of American Air-
lines, which entered the market for the first time on December 27, 1949.
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sound foundation. It is becoming apparent, however, that only a lim-
ited number of route segments have a sufficiently high average traffic
density to enable the achievement of such favorable results.
Using the same carriers as examples, Capital's New York-New
Orleans service, operated in competition with Eastern Air Lines, at-
tained a load factor of only approximately 43 percent through the first
quarter of 1950, and Northwest's Chicago-Portland service was under
45 percent for the same period. Such figures represent a loss even at
standard fares, and under present operating limitations these services
show little promise of economic success. It would appear than on such
routes even bargain rates will not attract sufficient traffic to produce the
high load factors required to make a payload at reduced fares.
A similar situation exists with respect to other carriers. The trans-
continental coach services of TWA and American between New York
and Los Angeles, operating with Constellation and DC-6 aircraft, have
to date consistently carried almost capacity loads. Eastern has achieved
impressive operating results between New York and Miami. Over
leaner routes, however, such as Kansas City-Los Angeles and New
York-Atlanta, the figures are not encouraging.
In short, experience to date tends to confirm that air coach service,
at least under present limitations, will be economically sound in and
of itself only on the exceptionally heavy traffic routes. And even these
routes can be assessed only in terms of the amount of duplicating com-
petition which may exist between each of the pairs of cities.
The number of such heavily traveled segments is extremely limited,
and there are practically none without existing duplicating competi-
tion. Air travel has traditionally been characterized by an extreme
concentration of traffic at a relatively small number of stations. As was
pointed out previously, the 10 largest airline stations account for al-
most 50 percent of the total domestic travel market. And in March,
1949, only 38 pairs of cities, out of a total of over 15,000 combinations,
developed as many as 50 airline passengers per day in each direction. 25
It should also be pointed out that on the very short-haul high-
density segments, such as New York-Boston and New York-Washington,
for example, it is unlikely that under present operating conditions
coach service can be operated without severe disruption of earnings,
for the production cost of all travel rises quickly as the length of haul
is diminished. Possibly such short segments may be successfully oper-
ated as part of a long haul, but the short haul, in itself, will hardly be
ready for coach fares until operating costs can be substantially reduced
by some method as yet undiscovered.
It is thus immediately apparent that even assuming in substantial
degree the generation of new air passengers as a result of the operation
25 A total of 24 of these principal pairs of cities already received scheduled
air coach service as of July 1, 1950.
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of coach services, there is a very definitely restricted area in which such
operations can be expected to develop on a self-sufficient basis.
As was inevitable, however, the pressures for rapid expansion of
coach services, from both the airlines and the public, have been great.
Proposals have regularly been advanced to increase the number of
schedules permitted, to use larger and faster aircraft, to activate new
air-coach routes, to add additional points to present routes, and to
liberalize the operating restrictions under which the service has been
conducted. To some extent these efforts have been successful, and the
past few months have seen a continuous, gradual extension of coach
operations.
Since the first of this year several important new coach routes have
been authorized.26 Additional points have also been added to present
routes.27 As of July 1, 1950, certificated air coach service was received
by 32 domestic cities, including 16 out of the 20 leading traffic-generat-
ing points. See Exhibit 4.
CAB Adherence to Coach Policy
In other respects, however, the Civil Aeronautics Board has adhered
fairly closely to its announced policy respecting limitations on the
coach-service experiment. Proposals by various carriers to substitute
newer and larger equipment for the DC-4s currently in use have been
generally denied, and all presently operating coach flights are being
conducted with high-density DC-4 equipment, with the exception of
the transcontinental services of TWA and American, where Constella-
tion and DC-6 aircraft, respectively, are being used. Likewise, the
limitation of departures to off-peak hours has also been maintained
for the most part, the only recent deviation from this restriction having
been in connection with the services of United and Western between
Los Angeles and San Francisco. In that case the Board, because of
the particular competitive situation resulting from intensive operations
by intrastate carriers, permitted not only departures at peak hours,
but also the operation of multiple schedules. Both of the carriers
presently operate four round trips per day between these points, de-
parting at convenient hours throughout the day.
20 Capital has added a Washington-Chicago nonstop service; Eastern and
National have both been authorized to operate a second New York-Miami schedule
via Washington, Jacksonville and West Palm Beach; Eastern has added a New
York-Houston service via Washington, Atlanta and New Orleans, as well as a
Detroit-Miami service via Cleveland, Charlotte, Atlanta and Tampa; and both
United and Western now operate local coach service on a nonstop basis between
San Francisco and Los Angeles. United has also received permission to operate a
competitive service to Western between Los Angeles and Portland-Seattle, via San
Francisco. Recently an application by Chicago and Southern to establish a route
between Chicago and New Orleans was also approved.
27 Delta now operates its Chicago-Miami service via Cincinnati, Atlanta and
Jacksonville, and the latter 2 cities have likewise been added to Eastern's opera-
tion between the same terminals. Great Falls, Montana, is a recently authorized
stop on Northwest's New York-Seattle coach schedule.
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Other than the above-mentioned exception, schedules have been
held to one round trip per day over each route. In a sense, however,
this limitation is more theoretical than real, since no supervision has
been exercised over the number of "extra sections" operated on an in-
dividual schedule, with the result that the number of trips operated on
a single day may be many more than the one schedule authorized. Over
certain routes, the amount of extra section mileage operated has con-
sistently exceeded 50 percent of the total air coach service flown.
In summary, it is evident that while the Board approach continues
to be conservative, the expansion of coach operations during recent
months has been both continuous and significant. The effect is par-
ticularly marked in some areas, and the long-range problems involved
are already becoming evident. As it is presently the operator of the
most extensive air coach services, an examination of Eastern Air Lines'
current situation may be rewarding.
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Eastern currently provides air service to some 72 domestic points.
Out of this number, only 15 are served on air coach schedules. But
included among these air coach points are 10 of Eastern's 15 principal
traffic centers. And with the exception of the New York-Boston and
St. Louis-Washington segments, its coach services blanket practically
every important city combination on its system. Several of these points
are included on different routes, and thus have more than one coach
schedule per day, and extra sections are operated as traffic demands.
28
Either directly or through connecting services, coach flights are avail-
able for all or portions of the journeys between most of the pairs of
cities on its entire system.
As a result, there is subjected to possible diversion to the lower
priced coach service a large portion of the traffic of Eastern and the
carriers competing with it, and the general effect may very well amount
to an important step in the direction of making the 4-cent coach fare
the basic level.
This is true not only for Eastern, but for all the other carriers in
Eastern's competitive area. The problems which are raised with respect
to competitive services are illustrated by the case of Chicago and South-
ern, with reference to Eastern's connecting coach service between Chi-
cago and Detroit, on the one hand, and Houston and New Orleans on
the other. In protesting to the Civil Aeronautics Board against the
establishment of this service, Chicago and Southern said:
"The overnight [standard-fare] service which C.&S. presently
operates between [the same] cities can scarcely be termed 'luxuri-
ous.' The flights operate with DC-3 equipment, whereas Eastern's
coach service will operate with DC-4's. The Chicago and Southern
flights will carry but one stewardess, whereas Eastern's coach serv-
ice presumably will have one steward. Chicago and Southern's
flights like Eastern's, will depart late at night and will arrive in
the early morning hours. Many of the C.&S. passengers, like East-
ern's, will make on-line connections en route. Neither the C.&S.
flights nor Eastern's will provide meal service. The reservation
procedures applicable to the flights of both carriers are substan-
tially identical.
"In other words, there is no significant distinction between Chi-
cago and Southern's overnight flights between its domestic ter-
minals and the so-called 'aircoach' services which Eastern proposes
to operate between the same cities. From the point of view of the
passenger, the only distinction of significance will be the fare and
the fact that the so-called 'coach' service will be operating with the
larger, more commodious DC-4 equipment."
In such a situation, the affected carrier must compete to survive,
and a chain reaction is begun which accelerates the downward trend
in passenger fares over a wide area. If allowed to proceed unchecked,
the eventual result must necessarily be a basic fare structure at the
28 In March, 1950, Eastern operated an average of 2.3 extra sections in each
direction per day on its New York-Miami nonstop coach schedule.
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4-cent coach level, with possibly an overlay of limited "super-luxury"
service at a premium rate.
This possibility is of course enthusiastically encouraged by the
consuming public. The average traveler has a very limited apprecia-
tion of the important economic factors involved, and is naturally de-
sirous of buying his transportation at "bargain" rates wherever possible.
In recent months newspaper and magazine articles supporting the
broadest extension of air coach operations have appeared with increas-
ing frequency,29 and the C.A.B. has received formal complaints from
smaller cities not now receiving such service requesting that the airlines
serving them be required to provide it.
Industry Not Ready for Basic 4-Cent Fare
Unfortunately, however, there is another side to the picture, and
the fact is that the airline industry is far from ready for a basic 4-cent
fare. For example, in 1949 the domestic passenger traffic of Eastern
Airlines accounted for approximately $32,300,000 in revenue after
direct flying costs, which was available for ground and indirect costs,
and profits. Assuming a 4-cent yield on this traffic, however, it would
have been necessary that Eastern carry a passenger volume of some 22
billion passenger-miles, or an increase of over 150 percent over the
actual 1949 volume of slightly less than a billion passenger-miles, to
produce the same contribution to overhead. Some increase in load
factors might be assumed, which would reduce direct costs, but, on
the other hand, overhead would probably be at least doubled as a result
of the tremendously increased volume, which would require the pro-
duction of an additional 2 billion passenger-miles to meet, in turn
increasing overhead, etc. The progression is almost geometric in char-
acter, and results in a passenger volume of very impressive proportions.
On the same basis, the domestic trunk-line system as a whole would
have had to produce almost 12 billion passenger-miles in 1949 at a
4-cent yield to realize the same dollar amount after direct flying costs
as was actually reported. Making no allowance whatever for increased
overhead, this alone would require a volume increase of almost 100
percent.
The achievement of the passenger volume necessary for the airlines
to hold their own under a 4-cent fare structure appears very proble-
matical under present conditions. It is easy to be misled by travel
figures into an assumption that there is an untapped potential for
low-cost air service of almost unlimited proportions. Upon closer
examination, however, the prospects are not quite so tremendous.
Potential Market for Low-Cost Air Service
In 1949 intercity air, rail and bus passenger travel amounted to
about 57 billion passenger-miles. Surface travel is, on the whole, about
29 See, e.g., "Air Travel Can Be Inexpensive," Consumer Reports, June, 1950.
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17 percent more circuitous than that via air, and after adjusting for
this factor the total common-carrier passenger market in 1949 was
approximately 50 billion air passenger-miles. Airline and pullman
travel accounted for about 30 percent of this total, and it is the balance
of 70 percent, or 35 billion passenger-miles, represented by rail coach
and bus traffic that is usually cited as the great potential for air travel
at coach rates.
It must be remembered, however, that the average journey by bus
is under 50 miles in length, and by rail coach under 100 miles, as com-
pared with over 400 miles via airline and pullman. Further, it is
generally true that at the present time air travel offers little in the way
of advantages to the traveler journeying a distance of less than 100
miles.30 In addition, while a 4-cent airline fare would be competitive
with rail-coach operations, its effect would be severely limited in com-
petition with the .present 2-cent bus fare level.
Taking all these factors into consideration, it is apparent that the
potential air coach market represented by rail coach and bus travel
is not the 35 billion passenger-miles it seems at first glance, but more
probably is somewhere in the vicinity of 10 billion passenger-miles.
There are certain unknown elements to be considered, of course,
such as newly generated travel and traffic diverted from private auto-
mobiles. But it seems clear that there is little prospect that the present
market is of such proportions as to make possible the operation of
air-coach services on other than a highly selective basis, except at the
cost of drastically reduced net revenues, which under our present pol-
icy means proportionately increased government subsidies.
VI. FUTURE AIR TRANSPORT PATTERN DEVELOPMENT
The broader question, of course, involves the direction of future
civil air transport policy. Are we to move toward the widest feasible
development of commercial air service, supported by Federal funds to
whatever extent necessary? Or is the policy to be more in line with
the concept advanced by the Secretary of Commerce, which envisions
the ultimate elimination of those air services which are not economi-
cally self-sufficient under free competitive conditions?
As was pointed out above, it seems clear that the expansion of
air coach service to the point where, in effect, it amounts to a substan-
tial lowering of the basic fare structure will result in a very greatly
increased amount of Federal subsidy, if air service is to continue to be
provided to the same extent as is now available. In such case not only
will it be necessary to provide mail compensation to the trunk lines to
the extent increases in traffic fail to make up for the lowered yield,
which in itself will be of staggering proportions, but, since passengers
are already being carried at a tremendous loss by all of the feeder
30 See "Effective Community Air Traffic Potential," Civil Aeronautics Admin-
istration, Dept. of Commerce, June, 1950.
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operators, any reduction in passenger revenues for these lines will come
directly from the taxpayers' pockets.3 '
It is of course within the province of the Congress to provide gov-
ernmental support on such a scale if it is deemed to be in the national
interest. There is no question but that a general reduction in fares to
the coach level would result in a great and rapid expansion in planes,
equipment and personnel, and a consequent increase in military reserve
value. It would, however, postpone for many years to come the likeli-
hood that any sizable segment of the industry could achieve financial
self-sufficiency, and for most of the carriers, result in permanent gov-
ernment subsidization.
On the other hand, the withdrawal of all Federal support, as sug-
gested by the Secretary of Commerce, would, if accompanied by a
general fare reduction to coach levels, result in the complete elimina-
tion of most of our present commercial air service. It would mean the
wholesale disappearance of all of the feeder lines and many of our
smaller trunks, and a drastic reduction in the services of those remain-
ing. Even at present yield levels, the curtailment in operations would
be most severe.
The extent of government financial support, which is in final
analysis a subsidy to the users of air transport service, has received
much critical attention during the past 2 years. Many responsible
persons feel that the subsidy is already too high; others believe that a
fair and objective appraisal will show that it is generally overstated,
and in any case, entirely justified. As a result of the very considerable
divergence of views, however, there has developed a quite general
insistence that steps be taken to separate so-called "compensatory"
mail pay and outright subsidy, in order that the extent of subsidy
may be fairly appraised and its worth evaluated.
Such a task, if undertaken, promises to be complicated and time
consuming. In an approach to the problem, however, Senator Edwin
C. Johnson, Chairman of the Senate group currently investigating air-
line finances, has given a very interesting indication of the extent to
which our present airline services fall short of economic self-sufficiency.
In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on
May 5, 1950, Senator Johnson presented the results of a preliminary
examination of airline subsidies.3 2 Using an approach which is based
upon admittedly unrefined methods and formulas, but which super-
ficially, at least, appears to be conservative, he concluded that for the
fiscal year 1949, Federal mail payments to the domestic airlines repre-
sented some 26 million dollars of "compensatory" pay and 32 millions
31 There is presently pending before the C.A.B. an application by Bonanza
Air Lines, a feeder carrier, to inaugurate coach-fare service between Reno and
Las Vegas, Nevada.
32 Interim Report on Separation of Air Mail Pay from Subsidy, 17 J. AIR L.
& CoM. 333 (1950).
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of subsidy, and that the latter figure included government support, in
varying amounts, of airline services to some 330 cities in the present
system, or over 75 percent of our airline communities.
Present Air Services Heavily Dependent on Subsidy
Although, as Senator Johnson stated, these figures are only indica-
tive and of limited value, they do serve to point up the extent to which
our present air services are dependent upon government support for
their existence. While no allocation formulas have as yet been devel-
oped by means of which the profitability of an individual station to
an individual airline can be conclusively determined, it seems fair to
state, upon the basis of such studies and expert opinions as are avail-
able, that at the very minimum fully one-half of our present airline
stations do not pay their own way, even under present yields. Given
a drastic fare reduction and the elimination of government support,
our air transport system would shrink to a handful of routes between
a score of our largest cities.
To elaborate a little further, let us examine an individual domestic
airline system - for example, Trans World Airlines. TWA is one of
our large transcontinental carriers, serving some 55 communities repre-
senting a fair cross section of our cities, from the large to the small.
In 1949 it carried about 1,400,000 domestic passengers, and had non-
mail revenues of some $58 million. With mail pay at the rate of 65.1
cents per ton-mile, net operating income was approximately $2.5
million. 33
As is the case with all our airlines, a few heavily traveled segments
produced sufficient profits to enable TWA to operate the rest of its
system, and in its case, to provide a small overall margin of earnings.
In other words, the "fat" supports the "lean."
Only a relative few of TWA's domestic route segments produced in
1949 a passenger traffic volume of as many as 20 passengers a day in
each direction. A handful produced much more than that. But using
that figure as a breaking point, and constructing a theoretical route
pattern from the segments producing not less than that volume, we
arrive at a system serving but seven of the 55 cities in TWA's present
pattern. This system would extend from New York to San Francisco,
and include the intermediate points of Pittsburgh, Chicago, St. Louis,
Kansas City and Los Angeles. In 1949 the route segments included in
this service pattern produced approximately 50 percent of TWA's total
domestic nonmail revenues.
These are the routes which could probably be operated profitably
on a freely competitive basis under a basic fare at the 4-cent coach
33 Amounting to 2.24 cents per revenue ton-mile. A reduction of but 1 cent
in the 1949 passenger yield of 5.68 cents would have changed this profit margin
into a loss of about 5.5 cents per revenue ton-mile. This underscores the extreme
sensitivity of airline finances with respect to fare adjustments.
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level. If TWA continued to operate the "lean" routes, it would soon
die from attrition.
At present yields, a number of additional segments probably pro-
duce at least break-even revenues. For illustrative purposes, let us
assume that these include all segments producing as many as 5 pas-
sengers in each direction per day during 1949. This would add some
18 additional cities to our theoretical routes, making a system total of
25 points.
This leaves 30 of TWA's present cities from which their service
would be withdrawn under the freely competitive air transport system
suggested by the Secretary of Commerce. These points are undoubtedly
served at a loss by TWA under present passenger fares, and they re-
ceive air service only as a result of the government-aided public utility
concept of the airline industry.
What is true of an individual airline is true of the air transport
system as a whole. A large proportion of our present service is made
possible only through government support and regulation. Even at
present yields the cost of that support is not small, but progress toward
self-sufficiency has been made, and under sound regulatory policies will
continue. But if the trend toward coach fares is allowed to grow un-
checked to the point where the basic fare structure is substantially
-reduced, then it seems clear that progress toward economic stability
will be reversed, and government funds will be needed on a larger
and longer basis if our airline system is to be maintained in, its present
form.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have not sought in this discussion to expound any theories or
provide answers to any questions. The objective has been merely to
suggest some of the problems presented by the so-called air coach
service experiment, and if in some measure we have helped to focus
thinking on these problems our purpose has been achieved.
One thing seems self-evident. If we are drifting into a long-term
policy whereby, through government support, air transportation is to be
permanently furnished to the user below cost, purely as a public
service, then the taxpayers of the country should be clearly informed,
to the end that they may determine whether the benefit is worth the
expenditure involved. It should not be "just allowed to happen" as a
result of so-called government experimentation.
